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THE NEW YORK ARTISTS' AUTHORSHIP RIGHTS
ACT: INCREASED PROTECTION AND ENHANCED
STATUS FOR VISUAL ARTISTS
"In this mechanical century, surely is not art sometimes the miracle?"
-Georges Roualt*
INTRODUCTION
An artist's enduring interest in her work enjoys recognition and
protection in Europe under the doctrine of droil moral, Translated liter-
ally as "moral right," droil moral encompasses a collection of prerogatives
that preserve the integrity of a creative work and the personality rights2
of its creator. The seventy-four member countries of the International
Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works3 (the "Berne
Convention") subscribe to this doctrine. Conspicuously absent from this
* Roualt, The Painter's Rights In His Work, reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART
WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 7 (1974).
1 For excellent discussion of the historical origins and jurisprudential development of
the droit moral, see DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the United States, 28 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 1 (1980); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral
Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1951); Roeder, The
Doctrine of(Moral Right: A Study of the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554
(1940); Sarraute, Current Theog on the Moral Right ofAuthors andArtists Under French Law, 16 AM.
J. COMP. L. 465 (1968); Tournier, The French Law of March 11, 1957 on Literay and Artistic
Property, 6 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 1 (1958).
Droit moral is codified in France as Law of March 11, 1957, 1957 Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Franqaise LJ.O.] 2723, 4143; 1957 Recueil Dalloz [D.L.] 102, 166 [hereinafter
cited as French Law of Mar. 11, 1957], in West Germany as Law of Sept. 13, 1965,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 1273 [hereinafter cited as German Law of Sept. 13, 1965], and in
Italy as Law of April 22, 1941, No. 633, Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gaz.
Uff.], as amended by Law of Aug. 23, 1946, No. 92 and Law of Jan. 8, 1979, No. 19. Transla-
tions of these statutes appear in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD
(1980).
2 The majority of civil law doctrines classify droit moral as a right of personality rather
than as a property right. Thus, like the right to one's identity, name, and privacy, droit moral
recognizes and protects an aspect of the artist's personality, not a pecuniary interest in an
artwork. See Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard But, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025 (1976)
(distinguishing property right of copyright law from personality right embodied in droit morat).
3 The International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [hereinaf-
ter cited as Berne Convention], was originally signed in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. It was
subsequently revised in 1908 (Berlin), 1928 (Rome), 1948 (Brussels), 1967 (Stockholm) (but
not ratified by a sufficient number of member states to bring the Stockholm Act into force),
and 1971 (Paris). Article 6bis of the Paris text provides in part:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.
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group is the United States.4
Federal law does not recognize any equivalent of droit moral 5 all
attempts to enact federal legislation establishing droll moral have been
unsuccessful. 6 Increased awareness 7 of the need for such legislation,
however, has prompted state action. In 1983 the New York legislature
passed the Artists' Authorship Rights Act,8 becoming the second state to
Reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 27 (1983). As of Jan. 1, 1983, 74
countries had ratified the Berne Convention. Id. app. 22.
4 The other notable exception is the Soviet Union.
5 Merryman, supra note 2, at 1035-36 ("[T]he moral right of the artist. . . simply does
not exist in our law."); see also Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[Tjhe doctrine of moral right is not part of the law in the United States
except insofar as parts of that doctrine exist in our law as specific rights-such as copyright,
libel, privacy and unfair competition." (citations omitted)).
6 Such efforts date back to 1940 when Sen. Elbert Thomas of Utah introduced a bill to
consolidate the copyright laws. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). Section 5 of the pro-
posed legislation, popularly called the Shotwell Bill, provided that:
(1) Nothing in this Act, nor any election to have copyright under this Act,
shall be deemed to alter or in any manner impair any legal or equitable right
or remedy of an author under common law or statutory law other than this
act, to claim the paternity of his work as well as the right to object to every
deformation, mutilation, or other modification of the said work which may be
prejudicial to his honor or to his reputation.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any pres-
ent or future valid contract or waiver in respect to the subject matter ofsubdi-
vision (1) of this section.
Little is known of the bill's legislative history, however, because no printed records of any
report or hearing on the bill are known to exist. Katz, supra note 1, at 419-20 & nn.229-32.
A moral rights amendment to the Copyright Act has been proposed in each Congress
since 1977, initially by Rep. Robert Drinan, and subsequently by his successor Rep. Barney
Frank. The most recent version of the proposal provides in part:
(d) Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work, the author or the author's legal representative shall have the right,
during the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death, to claim
authorship of such work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
alteration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copy-
right Office that would prevent prejudice to the author's honor or reputation.
Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment of 1983, H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG.
REc. H578 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983). Each bill has died in the House Judiciary Committee.
A legislative aide to Rep. Frank attributes this inaction to the absence of a mobilized constitu-
ency to lobby for passage. Telephone interview with legislative aid to Rep. Frank (Oct. 6,
1983).
7 This increased awareness is attributable to at least two factors-the substantial body
of commentary on moral rights generated within the last decade and the relatively recent
ascendancy of American art. In 1951 one writer explained that:
[T]he doctrine of moral rights has fared badly in America, not because of any
of the doctrine's weaknesses, or because it is basically repugnant to American
law, but rather because it has not received the serious intellectual examination
by either bench, bar, legislature or law school, to which it has been entitled.
Katz, supra note 1, at 420 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, it is only within the last quar-
ter century that American art has achieved international recognition, and "[Ilegal change
usually lags behind social and cultural change." Merryman, supra note 2, at 1042.
8 Artists' Authorship Rights Act, ch. 994, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1933 (codified at N.Y. ARTS
& CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 314.51-59 (McKinney 1984).
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establish a version of droil moral.9 Similar measures have been intro-
duced in several other states. 10
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act gives artists exhibit-
ing work within the state the legal right to claim or disclaim authorship
of a work of art I and to object to the display of their work if it has been
altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified without their consent.
12
This Note reviews the doctrine of droit moral and describes the inad-
equacies of its common law analogues. The Note then analyzes the New
York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, focusing on the purpose, parame-
ters, and problems of the legislation. In creating a new legal right, the
drafters sought to balance droit moral with the countervailing principles
of private ownership. Thus, the New York Act conservatively approxi-
mates its European statutory counterparts. 13 Comparisons with select
provisions of the California Art Preservation Act14 illustrate an alterna-
tive method of adapting droit moral to domestic law.
Finally, the Note proposes amendments to the New York Act
which, while respecting ownership rights, would more fully protect the
lasting interests of both the artist and society in the integrity of a work of
art.
A. The Doctrine of Droit Moral
Droil moral is a right of personality, 15 independent of property rights
and economic interests. The right is predicated on the conviction that a
9 In 1979 California enacted the California Art Preservation Act. 1979 Cal. Stat. 1501
(codified as amended at CAL. CiV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
In 1983, the Maine legislature passed a resolution authorizing the preparation of a form
contract, to be available to all artists selling their work in Maine, which stipulates that the
owner will not "physically deface, mutilate or destroy the work of art without permission of
the artist or the heir of the artist." 1983 Me. Acts 40. Although this resolution does not
recognize moral rights independent of contract rights, it is a positive step in that direction. In
fact, Rep. Meryl Nelson, the sponsor of the resolution, has introduced moral rights legislation
in Maine for the past four years. In the next legislative session, Rep. Nelson plans to reintro-
duce a bill on moral rights similar to the New York Act. Telephone Interview with Meryl
Nelson, Maine State Representative (Oct. 6, 1983).
10 Connecticut, Committee Bill No. 6228 (1983); Iowa H. No. 340 (1979); Massachu-
setts, H. Nos. 1079, 5316 (1981), H. No. 4314 (1982), H. No. 2021 (received initial approval in
the House, June 1983); Oregon, S. 355 (1979); Tennessee, S. 520 (1979); Texas, Health Bill
No. 422 (1983). Although these measures and similar legislation in Washington have failed to
win approval, several state legislatures will reconsider the bills in their next legislative
sessions.
11 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.55 (McKinney 1984).
12 Id. § 14.53.
13 See supra note 1. The French codification of droil moral will be the basis for comparison
in this Note because droit moral has attained its fullest jurisprudential articulation in France,
the country of its origin. Even in France, however, the doctrine is relatively young, and "has
not reached anything like its full development." Merryman, supra note 2, at 1026.
14 See in/a text accompanying notes 83, 98-100, 118, 136 & 148.
15 See supra note 2.
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work of art is more than a tangible commodity.1 6 Art embodies the
private vision of its creator. Picasso once remarked, "[t]he oeuvre one
creates is a form of diary."' 7 Just as certain aspects of personality are
safeguarded by the ConstitutionI 8 and state privacy statutes, 19 artwork,
as a manifestation of personality, merits protection from exploitation
against unauthorized treatment. 20
Closely aligned with this premise is respect for the inherent worth
and integrity of the work itself. Preservation is important because art
isolates, abstracts, and reflects a society's identity, values, turmoils, and
truths. Art enhances the cultural environment and endures as an im-
portant historical record for future generations. 2' The significance of
cultural preservation was aptly expressed in the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion: "Damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever
means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each person
makes its contribution to the culture of the world."' 22 These interrelated
concerns-protecting the artist's personality rights, preserving the in-
tegrity of artworks, and advancing society's interest in art preserva-
tion-have promoted the growth of artists' rights.
Droit moral traditionally consists of four components: 23 the right of
16 Cf Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (Sup. Ct.
1910) ("Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law does not require us to consider the sale of
the rights to a literary production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a barrel
of pork. . . . [A purchaser] cannot make as free use of them as he could of the pork which he
purchased.").
17 D. ASHTON, PICASSO ON ART: A SELECTION OF VIEWs 45 (1972) (quoting P.
Picasso).
18 A constitutional right to privacy was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965).
19 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (action for injunction
and damages to any person whose "name, portrait or picture is used within [the] state" for
purposes of advertising or trade without written consent).
20 The protection accorded individuals requires periodic redefinition: "Political, social,
and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eter-
nal youth, grows to meet the demands of society." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privay, 4
HARV. L. REv. 192, 192 (1890).
21 Professor of Art History Albert Elsen has written that art preservation is "essential to
knowledge and wisdom," and that a cultural heritage is "a country's identity card for the
present and passport to the future." Elsen, Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951,
952 (1976).
Another reason to protect works of art is that:
Paintings and sculptures. . . are the last handmade, personal objects within
our culture. Almost everything else is produced industrially, in mass, and
through a high division of labor. Few people are fortunate enough to make
something that represents themselves, that issues entirely from their hands
and mind, and to which they can affix their names.
Schapiro, The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art, ART NEWS, Summer 1957, at 36, 38.
22 Reprinted in Elsen, supra note 21, at 953. Since the early 1900s "all 50 states and over
500 municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings
and areas with historic or aesthetic importance." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
23 In addition to the four rights enumerated in the text, some writers also include the
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paternity,24 which is essentially the right to claim or disclaim authorship
of a particular work of art; the right of integrity,25 which protects a work
from alteration or defacement; the right of divulgation,26 which grants
the author the exclusive privilege of deciding when a work is ready to be
released to the public; and the right of withdrawal, 27 which permits an
author to retract a work from its owner. The New York Act addresses
the rights of paternity and integrity, the most important components of
droit moral.
B. Artists and The Common Law
Under American common law, property and contract rights over-
ride all other interests in a work of art. For example, in 1975, the Bank
of Tokyo Trust Company commissioned Isamu Noguchi to create a
sculpture for its Manhattan headquarters. Five years later bank execu-
tives, without notifying the artist, ordered the work cut up, removed,
and relegated to storage. Noguchi considered this an act of "vandalism
and very reactionary." 28 Yet, because the Bank had purchased the
piece, Noguchi lacked a legal remedy. 29
Other prominent artists have encountered similar problems.30 Al-
right to a prohibition against excessive criticism. See Roeder, supra note 1, at 572-73 (work of
artist "should be protected against abusive and malicious criticism, even if [criticism] is...
not libellous").
24 The paternity right is itself divided into four components: the right to require associ-
ation of one's name with one's work, the right not to be named the creator of works not
substantially one's own, the right to prevent false attributions and the right to use a nor de
plume. Hathaway, American Law Analogues to the Paternity Element of the Doctrine of Aoral Right: Is
the Creative Artist in America Real'y Protected?, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 121, 125
(1983).
25 The right of integrity is well-established in French jurisprudence; for a case upholding
the right of integrity, see Judgment of July 6, 1964, No. 62-13.544 (Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr.) (avail-
able on LEXIS) (artist painted composition of six panels for refrigerator and successfully
objected when the owner tried to sell one of the panels separately).
26 For a review of cases on this aspect of the droit moral, see Sarraute, supra note 1, at 467-
73 and Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right, " 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487,
487-94 (1968); see also Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in California." A Critical Appraisal,
15 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 29, 34 n.35 (1981) (citing unpublished article by Nimmer and Price
arguing that the artist's right of divulgation is adequately protected under federal copyright
law).
27 Under the French Law of March 11, 1957, the right of withdrawal applicable to
publishing contracts permits the author to retract a work from its owner on payment of an
indemnity. Sarraute, supra note 1, at 477. French jurisprudence is devoid of any cases claim-
ing this right. See id
28 Glueck, Bank Cuts Up a Noguchi Sculpture andStores It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1980, at A1,
col. 2.
29 Glueck, supra note 28; Sculptures Vandalized, 68 ART AMERICA 202 (1980). The sculp-
ture was later donated to the Jacksonville Museum of Art. Noguchi refused a request by the
Museum to supervise the reinstallation of his work. According to an assistant in his New
York studio, Noguchi had "'washed his hands of it.'" Barbanel, New York State Law Gives
Artists Right to Sue to Protect Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 5 & 37, col. 1.
30 For examples of such incidents, see, Rose, Calder's Pittsburgh: A Violated and Immobile
[Vol. 70:158
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though David Smith won acclaim as the preeminent American sculptor
of the twentieth century for his pioneering work in welded steel, his rep-
utation did not prevent the owners of one of his works from deliberately
stripping off its painted finish.3' Outraged by the unauthorized altera-
tion, but lacking any effective means of redress, Smith wrote to two art
publications in the summer of 1960 disclaiming the defaced sculpture as
his original work and suggesting that the art community "should start
an action for protective laws."'32
Although the esteem accorded Noguchi and Smith did not ensure
the integrity of their work, it did generate publicity and public aware-
ness. For the majority of artists, however, such incidents not only occur
with some regularity, but excite little comment.3 3 In most cases the acts
go unchallenged. Artists who seek judicial remedies usually fail due to
the difficulty of fitting their claims into existing forms of action in tort,
property, or contract.3 4
Mobile, ART NEws, Jan. 1978, at 39; Crawford, Moral Rights and The Artist, AM. ARTIST, Apr.
1978, at 98; Art Gives Wa to Nature, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1979, at 43, col. 3; Note, The Ameri-
canization ofDroit Moral in The California Art Preservation Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 901,
931-32 & nn. 134-35 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Americanization of Droit Moral]; Note,
Artworks and American Law: The CalifTornia Art Preservation Act, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1201, 1225-26 &
nn. 132-38 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Artworks].
31 Smith's painted sculptures were not as critically well-received or commercially valua-
ble as his works in unadorned metal. Nevertheless, according to art critic Hilton Kramer,
Smith had "a burning ambition to take constructed sculpture a step beyond. . . to join the
syntax of constructed sculpture to the esthetics of color, and thus produce a sculpture in
which both construction and color were given co-equal power." Kramer, Questions Raised by
Art Alterations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974, at 25, col. 1. Whether Smith successfully realized
his ambition is irrelevant-these pieces contribute to the dynamic, vital quality of Smith's
work. As Picasso once observed, "[f]rom errors one gets to know the personality." D. ASH-
TON, supra note 17, at 45.
32 Editor's Letters, ART NErWs, Summer 1960, at 6; Letters, ARTS, June 1960, at 5.
The executors of Smith's estate also altered his works. Art critic Clement Greenberg,
fellow artist Robert Motherwell, and Washington lawyer Ira Lowe authorized removal of the
finish from several works by sand-blasting or by allowing the works to remain outdoors and
unprotected. See Krauss, Changing The Art of David Smith, ART AMERICA, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at
30, 32.
33 Letters to New York Governor Cuomo urging him to sign the Authorship Rights bill
into law testified to the frequent occurrence of such incidents and the lack of effective reme-
dies. The past President of the Illustrators Guild and the Graphic Artists Guild of New York
commented, "I know personally of many cases where artists have been unduly injured in New
York State because they simply have no protection under the law." Letter from Simms
Taback to New York Governor Cuomo (July 6, 1983). Lawyers who represent artists wrote:
"I am an arts attorney, and a former Director of Legal Services at Volunteer Lawyers for the
Arts, and have seen many abuses to which artists are subjected." Letter from Leonard D.
Easter to New York Governor Cuomo (July 6, 1983). "I believe, from my substantial experi-
ence in dealing with matters relating to artists, that this bill would redress many problems
now faced by artists and be a significant benefit for a large number of New York citizens who
will be protected by it." Letter from Joel L. Hecker to Governor Cuomo (July 7, 1983) (Let-
ters on file at Cornell Law Review).
34 Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States
Copyight Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 521 (1967).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:158
1. Tort and Statutory Actions35
Aggrieved artists have resorted to common law theories of unfair
competition 36 and defamation, 37 privacy statutes,3 8 section 43(a) of the
Lanham Trademark Act, 39 and copyright law in order to establish au-
35 For comprehensive discussion of the case law in this area, see Roeder, supra note 1, at
558-72; Treece, supra note 26, at 487-500; Note, Artworks, supra note 30, at 1205-15; Comment,
Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing Amencan Legal
Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1540-58 (1972).
36 Unfair competition claims stem from product misrepresentation in the marketplace.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921) (defendant's unauthorized use
of "Mutt" and "JeW' cartoon characters found to deceive public and reduce financial value of
characters to creator).
Unfair competition claims involve the relationship among creators of a work, the seller,
and the public. In contrast, droit moralconcerns the relationship among the artist, the work of
art, and the public. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
37 In a defamation claim an artist asserts that a change or distortion in the work dam-
ages his or her reputation. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168
N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1960) (actionable defamation claim by lawyer for injury due
to unauthorized use of his name on revised edition of his book where revision contained nu-
merous inaccuracies); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929)
(plaintiff libeled by publication under her name of an article that she did not write and that
contained inaccurate information). But cf. Meliodon v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa.
457, 195 A. 905 (1938) (holding that plaintiff sculptor had set forth no ground justifying relief
where he claimed his work was so altered that as an artist he had become an object of ridicule
and unable to gain new commissions).
One of the shortcomings of defamation actions is that the death of the artist extinguishes
all claims because a defamation claim is personal to the person defamed. Cf W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 111, at 744-45 (4th ed. 1971). Furthermore, any artist
who is a "public figure," i.e., "anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is
focused upon him as a person," must meet the rigorous standards of proof of malice set by
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). W. PROSSER, supra § 118, at 824. For
a discussion of the Sullivan case and its progeny, see id. at 819-33.
38 See, e.g., Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 667
(1933). In Nqland, a well-known marine painter brought an action under New York's privacy
statute, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84), to prevent defendants from
selling a crude reproduction of one of his paintings as a design for an embroidered sofa cush-
ion with the legend "'straight from the painting by Harry Neyland.'" 65 F.2d at 363. The
statute provided a remedy because Neyland had not sold reproduction rights to the defend-
ants, but had merely allowed a magazine to photographically reproduce the painting. Id. at
363-64. The court suggested that Neyland would have been without redress if the Home
Pattern Company had been direct purchasers because" '[n]othing contained in [§ 51] shall be
so construed as to prevent any person. . . from using the name. . . of any . . . artist in
connection with his. . . artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such name
.' " Id. at 364 (quoting N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 51).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) prevents the deceptive packaging of goods in interstate
commerce. For cases applying the Lanham Trademark Act to artworks, see, e.g., Gilliam v.
ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (order enjoining broadcasts because televising drasti-
cally edited version of Monty Python would cause harm to plaintiffs' reputation); Yameta Co.
v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.) (recording misrepresented as featuring
Jimi Hendrix held to violate Lanham Act), vacated on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968).
For commentary on the ad hoc use of the Lanham Act to protect authorship rights, see Dia-
mond, Legal Protection for the 'Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP.
244, 267-69 (1978); Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act-A
Judicial Shell Game?, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 377 (1980); Sokolow, A New Weapon for Artists'
Rights: Section 439(a) [sic] of the Lanham Trademark Act, ART & LAW, Issue 2, 1980, at 32.
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thorship rights.40 None of these analogues, however, affords a degree of
protection, comparable to the European droil moral, or sufficient to safe-
guard the artist's personality rights and the integrity of an artwork.41
Further, such an array of theories fosters confusion and inconsistent re-
sults. Redress depends more on the fortuity of facts conforming to es-
tablished precedents than on the merits of a claim. A comprehensive
cause of action addressing an essentially homogeneous problem would
eliminate such inequity.
40 The purpose of copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally The Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The law "as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of actions for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors." Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24
(2d Cir. 1976).
Copyright law vests the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies of a work in
the copyright owner, but this may not necessarily be the creator of the work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 202. The Copyright Act does not address the right of paternity. See Hathaway, supra note
24, at 126-29. Further, most artists are reluctant to use copyright. See Sheehan, Why Don't
Fine Artists Use Statutog Copyright?, 22 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 242, 271 (1975) (citing survey
indicating some artists lack "sufficient knowledge" of statutory copyright while others believe
"a visible notice [would deface] a work of art"). Cf. Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under
the Coppright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1490, 1504-05 (1979) (suggesting way that copy-
right can be used to protect artworks).
The separate but related issue of whether the Copyright Act preempts state moral rights
legislation is beyond the scope of this Note. For persuasive arguments that it does not, see
Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980) (applica-
tion of preemption doctrine depends on area of law because "crucial inquiry is not whether
state law reaches matters also subject to federal regulation, but whether the two laws function
harmoniously [together]'); Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art
Preservation Act as a Modelfor Statutoi, Reform, 49 Gto. WASH. L. REv. 873, 893-900 (1981)
(arguing that California's Art Preservation Act is not subject to federal preemption); Nimmer,
supra note 34, at 519 ("most probable that the federal preemption provision of the bill does
not vitiate state protection of moral rights'); Note, Artworks, supra note 30, at 1231-39 (Califor-
nia Act not preempted). ButseeFrancione, The California Art Preservation Act and Federal Preemp-
tion by the 1976 Copyrght Act-Equvalence and Actual Conflict, 18 CAL W.L. REv. 189, 214-17
(1982) (California law preempted due to actual conflict, not on equivalency grounds).
41 A comparison of two cases provides a graphic demonstration of the disparity between
artists' rights in this country and under droit moral in France. In 1948, the Russian composer
Dmitri Shostakovich sued Twentieth Century Fox for using his music in an anti-Soviet movie.
Shostakovich claimed that the use of his music in the film suggested that he was disloyal to his
country. Shostakovich v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575,
578 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aftd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). The court denied relief
under § 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law and under defamation and moral rights theo-
ries. 196 Misc. at 69-70, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78.
When the same case was brought in France to prevent foreign distribution of the film,
however, the composer prevailed. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1953, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1954
Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 16, 80. But see Strauss, The MoralRight of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP.
L. 506 (1955) (American courts offer artists substantially same degree of protection afforded
by European courts under droit mora); Comment, Moral Rights in the United States, 35 CONN.
B.J. 509, 516 (1961) ("moral rights of the artist are substantially protected under the existing
law").
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2. Property Rights
Every artist initially has a vested proprietary interest in a finished
creation. As the owner, the artist can control the disposition or use of
the work. Property law upholds this prerogative. Upon selling or other-
wise disposing of the artwork, the artist loses this control.42 Even if the
artist retains a colorable property claim, a legal action to enforce au-
thorship rights on that ground is indirect and inefficient. The case of
Stella v. Mazoh43 illustrates this use of a property claim.
In 1966 Frank Stella placed two rain-damaged canvases on the
landing outside his loft-studio, intending to discard them. Before he
could do so, the canvases disappeared. In the spring of 1982, Stella dis-
covered the paintings offered for sale at a New York gallery.44 Stella
sued to enjoin the gallery from selling the paintings and from represent-
ing them as his work. One portion of his affidavit reads:
I verily believe that as an artist and as a creator, I am entitled to
pick and choose and select those items which are to be sold, distrib-
uted and more important, to be known to the general public and the
world as a painting or work of Frank Stella. . . . I respectfully sub-
mit that no one is entitled to cause another to have his reputation
demeaned, diminished or tarnished by taking his rejected paintings
from within or without his premises and then offer them to the public and
to the world as the artist's works and representative of his abilities,
talents and creativity.45
Because American courts do not acknowledge artists' moral rights,
Stella instituted a property action to regain control of the canvases. 46
The New York trial court granted Stella a temporary restraining order
pending a hearing.4 7 Shortly thereafter, the parties settled the case out
of court. Stella recovered the paintings and destroyed them.
The specific purpose of Stella's suit was not to recover stolen prop-
erty, but to prevent the damaged paintings from being represented as
his work and thereby harming his reputation as an artist. Had Stella
abandoned or sold the canvases, he probably would not have succeeded.
In contrast, the doctrine of droil moral entitles an artist to disclaim au-
42 See Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) ("It is true that the law recognizes certain property rights of an author in his finished
creation. But, as in other property rights, the law gives effect to a clear unequivocal transfer
of such rights pursuant to a contract and for valuable consideration.").
43 No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 1982).
44 See ART NEws, Summer 1980, at 11.
45 Affidavit of Frank Stella at 6-7, Stella v. Mazoh, No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1,
1982) (emphasis in original).
46 See id. at 4-5; Verified Complaint, Stella v. Mazoh, No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr.
1, 1982).
47 Order to Show Cause For a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Or-
der, Stella v. Mazoh, No. 07585-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 1982).
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thorship and prevent the public display of mutilated paintings despite a
lack of ownership or possession.
3. Contract Claims
If an artist shows an express or implied contractual agreement to
have her name associated with a work, courts generally uphold the
agreement.48 An artist can also use contract language to prevent being
misrepresented as the creator of a work.49 In these cases vindication of
authorship rights hinges upon the terms of the agreement and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transfer of the artwork. The issue is not one
of moral rights, but of contract interpretation.
For example, in Vargas v. Esquire,50 an artist produced a series of
drawings for Esquire Magazine under a contract that provided in perti-
nent part: "'The drawings so furnished, and also the name 'Varga,'
'Varga Girl,' 'Varga Esq.,' and any and all other names, designs or
materials used in connection therewith, shall forever belong exclusively
to Esquire .. ' "5 When Esquire published some of the illustrations
without crediting the artist, Vargas sued to enforce his authorship
rights. The court denied his petition, stating that Vargas had "divested
himself of every vestige of title and ownership of the pictures. '52
Comparing Vargas with a factually similar French case reveals the
striking disparity in protection and status granted to artists in this coun-
try and abroad. In Guille c. Cohmant 5 3 the artist's right of paternity over-
rode a specific contract provision obligating the artist to sell some works
without signatures and some under an assumed name. The case graphi-
cally demonstrates that under the French Law of March 11, 1957, the
right of paternity is "perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible. ' '54
Granting such explicit priority to artists' moral rights is necessary
48 See Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910)
(implied agreement between parties required author's name to appear on byline); cf. I M.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 110 (author's right to demand that his name be affixed to his work is
only imperfectly recognized in this country).
49 See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (where defendant agreed to
produce records bearing legend, "Presented by Norman Granz," contract implied duty not to
sell records which made legend false representation).
50 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
51 Id. at 525.
52 Id. In addition to the more conventional contract argument, Vargas asserted a moral
right claim, to which the court gave short shrift:
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in this country to
conform to that of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire
whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative or judicial
branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to make any new
law in this respect.
Id. at 526.
53 Judgment of Nov. 15, 1966, 1967 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284.
54 French Law of Mar. 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 6.
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to ensure recognition of authorship and preservation of artistic integrity.
Relying on contract terms for such protection is tenuous because artists
tend to be unaware of their legal rights55 and may be in a weak bargain-
ing position relative to the purchasers of their work.56 Furthermore, the
characteristic informality of most art sales affords little opportunity to
contract for integrity and paternity rights.57 As one New York art law-
yer noted, "[t]here is no branch of commerce in which the UCC and the
Statute of Frauds seems more irrelevant than in the art market." 58
C. Property and Contract Rights v. Authorship Rights
The preceding sections demonstrate that the common law inade-
quately safeguards an artist's authorship rights and the public's interest
in art preservation, especially when those interests clash with property
and contract rights. Further, artists' claims to protect their rights of au-
thorship and the integrity of their artwork are frequently fragmented in
order to fit within a conventional legal theory. Enactment of compre-
hensive artists' rights laws requires legislators to reconcile the conflicting
social interests represented by artist, owner, and the artwork.59 Droit
moral necessarily limits the property or contract rights60 of an artwork
55 See, e.g., Projansky, The Perilous World of Art Law, 4 JURIs DR., June 1974, at 14, 15
("artists, unlike almost all other professionals, tend to be amazingly ignorant of their legal
rights'); Weil, The "Moral Right" Comes to California, ART NEws, Dec. 1979, at 88.
56 See generally Letter from WalterJ. Maroney on behalf of Franklin Furnace Archives to
New York Governor Cuomo (July 21, 1983) ("Too often . .. the price of exhibition in a
prestigious forum has been a. . .ceding of control over display conditions.") (on file at Cor-
nell Law Review); Sheehan, supra note 40, at 268 (factors contributing to "an art market in
which the fine artist is left with very little bargaining power with which to assert legal rights":
(1) very few influential art collectors determine financial success or failure of new artist, (2)
financial status of most art galleries is precarious, and (3) many collectors are uncertain and
distasteful of fine art copyright); Note, Arlworks, supra note 30, at 1225 & nn. 132-37 (citing
further authority in support of this proposition).
The lack of bargaining power often subjects artists to contracts of adhesion; because
American law permits the surrender of paternity rights, the right may be waived without an
artist's true consent. See Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
57 Projansky, supra note 55, at 17.
58 Id.
59 Statement by Matthew J. Murphy, Chairman, New York State Assembly Committee
on Tourism, the Arts and Sports Development (June 26, 1983) ("This legislation seeks to
balance the property rights of owners against the creative rights of artists and society's right
to safeguard its artistic treasures . . . ") (on file at Cornell Law Review).
60 Alan Sieroty, California State Senator and sponsor of the California Art Preservation
Act, acknowledged the necessity of limiting owners' property and contract rights and de-
scribed how his state's legislators overcame their initial reservations about doing so:
To pass this law, you have to get legislators to rethink their concepts of prop-
erty rights. Property rights are very strong in this country, and that's why we
have not adopted art preservation laws. You have to begin to think that
maybe the person who created the work of art, and perhaps also the public,
retain some interest in seeing that the art is not destroyed, not mutilated, and
not changed without the artist's consent. The first impression that members
of the judiciary committee had when we presented our bill was, "it's mine, I
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owner, but such restrictions are not new to the law.6 ' Zoning,62 nui-
sance, 63 and historic preservation statutes64 reflect similar balancing of
competing social interests. The need to accommodate these competing
values, as well as the need to provide a uniform cause of action for a
unique legal problem, demands enactment of artists' moral rights
legislation.65
THE NEW YORK ARTISTS' AUTHORSHIP RIGHTS ACT
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act 66 increases the pro-
tection of artworks and enhances artists' rights in their artwork within
New York State. The protection the New York Act accords artists is
modest compared to that conferred by European statutes based on the
droit moral doctrine.67 The Act, however, takes a significant first step in a
new and positive direction towards encouraging acceptance of artists'
moral rights throughout the country.
The New York Act entitles an artist to legal and injunctive relief6
if any person knowingly displays, in a public place within the state, the
can do anything with it, I can cut it up if it's too big for a certain place that I
want to put it." But gradually the committee members recognized what we
were trying to say and accepted it.
Excerpt from miscellaneous materials from the National Conference of State Legislatures (on
file at Cornell Law Review).
61 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; private rights are subject to public regulation).
62 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning law
prohibiting industrial establishment in residential section despite injury to complaining land-
owner).
63 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding ordinance prohibit-
ing continuation of brickyard business because that activity was inconsistent with neighbor-
ing land uses).
64 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978)
("States . . . may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city. . . .'. See generaly An-
drus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (public good often curtails use or economic exploitation
of private property).
65 The limitations imposed by moral rights legislation do not amount to a taking of
property. The restrictions do not deprive the collector of the enjoyment and investment ad-
vantages of art acquisition. "[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed
in its entirety." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
66 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.51 (McKinney 1984). The Act, co-sponsored
by Assemblyman Richard Gottfried and Senator Tarky Lombardi, was signed into law on
August 8, 1983, and took effect on January 1, 1984. The measure passed the Assembly by a
vote of 145 to 3 and was adopted unanimously by the Senate. See New York State Assembly
Comm. on Tourism, Arts & Sports, Bill Memorandum A. 5052 (as amended), 206th Sess.
(Apr. 19, 1983); 1983 N.Y. ASSEMBLY J. (June 26, 1983); 1983 N.Y. SENATE J. 140 (June 26,
1983).
67 See supra note 1 (citing French, German, and Italian laws protecting artists' moral
rights).
68 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.59 (McKinney 1984).
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artist's work (or any reproduction of it) in an altered, defaced, muti-
lated, or modified form. The law, however, contains two limiting
provisos. First, the work must be reasonably regarded as that of the
artist. Second, the display must be reasonably likely to damage the art-
ist's reputation.69 The Act also allows an artist to claim authorship, or,
upon a showing of just and valid reasons, to disclaim authorship of a
work of art.70 The New York Act, thus, establishes a continuing rela-
tionship between artist, artwork, and owner that is not otherwise suffi-
ciently respected in general commercial law.
A. Purpose of the Act
Several factors prompted the enactment of the New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act. First, the Act's statement of legislative findings
and declaration of purpose emphasize the need to protect the rights and
reputations of New York artists.7 1 Acknowledging that the alteration of
artwork may destroy a work's integrity and injure the artist's reputa-
tion,72 the Act seeks to protect these intertwined interests by prohibiting
certain unauthorized modifications to the works and by providing legal
redress to the artist if violations occur.
Second, the Act benefits the public. The drafters recognized that
society has an interest in safeguarding art.73 The New York State legis-
lature has acknowledged that "the general welfare . . . will be pro-
moted by giving further recognition to the arts as a vital aspect of our
culture and heritage." 74
Finally, the Act ensures that New York's statutes reflect the stature
of art produced and displayed in the state. 75 New York has long been a
cultural mecca 76 and a forerunner in arts legislation; 77 the legislature
wanted it to remain so. 78
B. Nature of the Rights Protected
In letters to the Governor of New York urging approval of the Art-
ists' Authorship Rights Act, two sponsors described the bill as guaran-
69 Id. § 14.53.
70 Id. § 14.55.
71 Artists' Authorship Rights Act, ch. 994, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1933, 1933.
72 Id
73 See Statement by Matthew J. Murphy, supra note 59.
74 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 3.01 (McKinney 1984).
75 See Letter from Matthew J. Murphy, Chairman, New York Assembly Committee on
Tourism, the Arts and Sports Development, to New York Governor Cuomo (July 22, 1983)
(on file at Comell Law Review).
76 See Artists' Authorship Rights Act, ch. 994, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1933 ("New York
state is the home of many artists of international repute").
77 See generaly id
78 See N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 3.01 (McKinney 1984).
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teeing artists' right of paternity. 79 Their emphasis is not surprising. The
right of paternity does not radically interfere with private ownership,
and, therefore, it is more palatable to critics of artists' moral rights than
is the right of integrity. The law, however, by prohibiting the public
display or reproduction of an artwork in a defaced or modified form,80
also establishes a limited integrity right.8 '
1. Paternity Rights
The right to claim authorship granted in section 14.55 of the New
York Act inheres in the artist during her lifetime, whether or not she
contracts for the right or sells the work. The French Law of March 11,
1957,82 and the California Art Preservation Act 83 provide similar rights.
Thus, if the Vargas 84 case were retried in New York today, the decision,
like that in the Guille85 case, would vindicate the illustrator's authorship
rights.
An artist's right to disclaim authorship-to disassociate her name
from a work of art-requires a "just and valid reason" under the New
York Act.86 Alteration or mutilation of the work without the artist's
consent would be a "just and valid" reason if "damage to the artist's
reputation is reasonably likely to result or has resulted therefrom. '87 An
artist can also disclaim authorship for other reasons that meet the "just
and valid" standard if damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably
likely.88
79 Letter from Richard Gottfried, Assistant Majority Leader, New York Assembly, to
New York Governor Cuomo (July 5, 1983); Letter from Matthew J. Murphy, supra note 75.
The sponsors' emphasis on the paternity provision, see infa text accompanying notes 82-88,
was adopted by the Governor. A press release describing the new law makes no mention of
§ 14.53 and the right of integrity. See Memorandum dated Aug. 8, 1983, filed with A. 5052-B,
206th Sess. (N.Y. 1983). See supra note 24 and accompanying text and inra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text (discussing right of paternity).
80 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.53 (McKinney 1984).
81 See supra note 25 and infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing right of
integrity).
82 French Law of Mar. 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 6.
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d) (West 1982).
84 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947) (discussed supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text).
85 Judgment of Nov. 15, 1966, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1967 D.S. Jur. 284; see supra text
accompanying notes 53-54.
86 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.55 (McKinney 1984).
87 Id.
88 An earlier draft of the Act stated that "nothing contained in this article shall abridge
the right of a person to frame. . . a work of fine art." A. 5052, 206th Sess., 228-o(3) (N.Y.
1983). The definition of "to frame" was "to prepare or cause to be prepared a work of fine
art for display, in a manner customarily considered appropriate for a work of fine art in a
particular medium." Id § 228-m(2). Omission of this language from the final Act evidences
the drafters' belief that the manner of display can, under certain circumstances, alter or mod-
ify a work to such an extent that the artist should be entitled to a cause of action under the
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2. Integzo Rzghts
Section 14.53 of the New York Act provides a limited right of integ-
rity.8 9 The law does not bar an owner from altering, defacing, mutilat-
ing, or modifying a work of art. It does prohibit the artwork's
subsequent public display if the work is represented as, or would reason-
ably be regarded as, belonging to the artist, and if such display is reason-
ably likely to damage the artist's reputation. 90
The limited nature of the right conferred in section 14.53 is a com-
promise between traditional principles of private ownership on the one
hand and the integrity of artworks and artists' personality rights on the
other.9 1 The statutory ban on public display of an altered work should
deter abusive treatment and thereby protect artists, but it does so with-
out intefering with the prerogatives of purely private collectors. The
prohibition, however, exists only during the lifetime of the artist. Ex-
tending the application of the Act beyond the lifetime of the artist
would increase the force of the law in deterring alteration or defacement
of artwork.92 Nevertheless, to fully guarantee a work's integrity and
society's interest in preservation would necessitate a prohibition against
all acts of alteration, an encroachment on ownership rights that the New
York legislature was apparently unwilling to pursue.93
C. Scope of the Law
1. Works of Fine Art
The New York Act applies "to works of fine art knowingly dis-
played. . . , published or reproduced" in New York.9 4 A "work of fine
art" includes "any original . . .painting; drawing; print; [or] photo-
law. Telephone Interview with Wendy E. Feuer, Legislative Associate, New York Assembly
Committee on Tourism, the Arts and Sports Development (Oct. 25, 1983).
Section 14.55 may also permit an artist to prevent false attributions, traditionally an
element of the right of paternity. If construed liberally, § 14.55, allowing an artist to disclaim
authorship of her work for just and valid reason, should also permit an artist to disassociate
her name from another's work.
89 See N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.53 (McKinney 1984). In contrast, the
French law vests in the artist an exclusive, perpetual right to respect for her work. See French
Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 6.
90 N.Y. AcTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAWS § 14.53.
91 An earlier version of the Act gave artists the right to prevent alterations or destruction
ofartworks, but the "practical, political, legal and constitutional obstacles" necessitated legis-
lative modifications in order to secure support for passage of the bill. See Letter from Richard
Gottfried, supra note 79. The fact that the California Art Preservation Act prohibits not only
display of an altered work, but also intentional physical alteration or destruction of a work of
art suggests that the legal and constitutional obstacles to a fuller right of integrity are not
insurmountable and that the real hurdles are practical and political. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 987(c) (West 1982).
92 See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 91.
94 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.57(5) (McKinney 1984).
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graphic print or sculpture of a limited edition of no more than three
hundred copies,"' 95 but excludes "sequential imagery" such as motion
pictures or video art.96 The New York definition resembles that of the
French law, which applies without distinction to "authors of all intellec-
tual works, regardless of their kind, form of expression, merit or pur-
pose."' 97 The California Art Preservation Act defines fine art more
narrowly as "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original
work of art in glass, of recognized quality."9 8 The drafting of New
York's statute improves upon California's in two respects. First, the
open-ended New York definition avoids a rigid delineation of "fine
art,"99 obviating the need for varying groups of artists to lobby for inclu-
sion within the protective ambit of the statute.10 0 Second, by not adopt-
ing the California "recognized quality" caveat, the New York Act better
serves the needs of all artists and the purpose of moral rights legislation.
The courts should not be called upon to determine whether art is of
"recognized quality." Inconsistent holdings would inevitably result and
would frustrate the uniform and predictable application of the law.' 0 t
The California statute stipulates that in making such determinations
"the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collec-
tors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons involved with
the creation or marketing of fine art."10 2 Yet, experts often disagree. 10 3
95 Id. § 14.51(5). There are two technical difficulties with this definition. The art world
does not regard either an unlimited edition print or a sculpture in an edition of 300 as a work
of fine art. Letter from Ralph F. Colin, Administrative Vice President, Art Dealers Associa-
tion of America, Inc., to Ben Wiles, Assistant Counsel to the Governor of New York (July 12,
1983) (on file at Comell Law Review). According to one legislative associate, the definition of
prints was an error and will be corrected by an amendment. Telephone Interview with
Wendy E. Feuer, supra note 88. The provision for works of sculpture was intentional because
many are produced or cast more than once. Id
96 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.51(5). The collaborative nature ofsequential
imagery art might make application of authorship rights unwieldly. The French Law of
March 11, 1957, for example, lists five people who must be considered the "authors" of a film.
See French Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 14.
97 French Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 2.
98 CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
99 Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) ("Individual perception of the beautiful
is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art.").
100 As first enacted, the California statute applied only to paintings, sculptures, and
drawings. Ch. 409, § 2, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1500-03. Lobbying efforts by artists who work in glass
led to an expansion of the definition in 1982. Ch. 1517, § 1, 1982 Cal. Stat. 5885; seesupra text
accompanying note 98.
101 It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
102 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(0 (West 1982).
103 See, e.g., Your Word Against Mine-Expert Testimony in The Valuation of Fine Art, 5 ART &
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Basing protection on such a standard is arbitrary, capricious, and incon-
sistent with the philosophy behind artists' moral rights legislation. The
law purports to protect the personality and reputation of artists. These
rights arise from the creation of artwork, not just the creation of a criti-
cally acclaimed work. As Justice Holmes wrote in 1903, "even . . . a
very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone." 104 It is this intangible quality, distinguishing art from
mere economic chattels, that artists' moral rights legislation is intended
to protect and promote.
2. Trade Use
New York's Authorship Rights Law does not apply to work "pre-
pared under contract for advertising or trade use unless the contract so
provides."' 0 5 The scope of this exemption is ambiguous because "trade
use" is a nontechnical term undefined by the Act.' 0 6 Although art pre-
pared for advertising may be a readily identifiable and discrete cate-
gory, a broad reading of the term "trade use," equating it with any
commercial use, could deny the Act's protection to commissioned works
by professional artists. This result contravenes the spirit and intent of
the law. Although courts have been sensitive to legislative intent when
construing "trade" in statutes, 10 7 the legislature should define "trade
use" rather than rely on the courts to determine which technical and
professional artists'0 8 are included within the Act's protection.
One possible approach is to exclude "work for hire" as that term
LAW 69 (1980) (where IRS sought value of a Corot canvas from Art Advisory Panel, the
estimates varied by $210,000, from $40,000 to $350,000 and the Court settled on $125,000.);
Note, Artwork, supra note 30, at 1222 n. 117 and cases cited therein.
104 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
105 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.57(4) (McKinney 1984). An earlier version
of the bill extended protection to commercial art but permitted artists to waive these rights at
any time. A. 5052, 206th Sess., § 228-d(4) (N.Y. 1983).
106 According to one of the legislative associates who worked closely on the drafting of the
Act, the term was intentionally left vague. The drafters wanted to protect some art produced
for sale, but not, for example, the graphic art designed for gum wrappers. Telephone Inter-
view with Wendy E. Feuer, supra note 88. It is left to the courts to interpret and give effect to
the drafters' intent by defining the trade exemption on a case by case basis.
107 See, e.g., Paulsen v. Personality Posters, 59 Misc. 2d 444, 447-48, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501,
505-06 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (restrictive reading of "for the purposes of trade" because statute not
intendedto reach activities involving the dissemination of news or public information); People
v. Polar Vent of Am., 10 Misc. 2d 378, 381-82, 174 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793-94 (Sup. Ct. 1957)
(given purpose and wording of statute prohibiting trade on Sabbath, the legislature must
have intended that "trade" be defined broadly).
108 Letters supporting the bill were submitted by the Executive Director of the Cartoon-
ists Guild, Letter from Ron Wolin to New York Governor Cuomo (June 16, 1983), the Presi-
dent of the New York Metropolitan Chapter of the American Society of Interior Designers,
Letter from Michael Wiener to Governor Cuomo (July 19, 1983), a medical illustrator, Letter
from Robin Tarasov to Governor Cuomo (June 15, 1983), and numerous other professional
graphic artists whose work could ostensibly be considered to be prepared under contract for
trade use. (Letters on file at Comell Law Review).
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developed under the 1909 Copyright Act. 109 There, when an employee
created "something in connection with his duties under his employment,
the thing created [was] the property of the employer and any copyright
obtained thereon by the employee [was] deemed held in trust for the
employer.""t0 The critical question in determining whether the creation
of art was within the scope of employment was "whether the employer
possessed the right to direct and to supervise the manner in which the
work was being performed."' l
This standard effectively balances the competing interests of con-
tractor and artist. If an employer directs and supervises the creation of a
work, that employer should have free rein to use or modify the work.
Ceding control to the employer would not dilute authorship rights be-
cause "work for hire" is not a manifestation of tfie artist's personality.
The purpose of droit moral is to protect an act of creation, not mechanical
execution.
3. Conservation
Acts taken to correct or prevent deterioration or alteration are not
actionable as alterations or defacements under the New York Act unless
the conservation work is negligently performed." 12 Although some con-
servators are concerned that the Act fails to "clearly allow curing harm
which results from accidental damages or curing an 'inherent de-
fect,' "113 permissible acts to correct alterations should encompass cor-
rection of accidental damages, and license to prevent deterioration
should authorize curing inherent defects. In any event, New York muse-
ums should have little to fear because an artist complaining of an act of
109 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). For a discussion of the different meanings of work for hire
under the common law, the 1909 Copyright Act, and the current Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1982), see Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-56 (D.N.J. 1981); 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 3, § 5.03[B].
110 Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aj'd, 142
F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
111 Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970); see also Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Work for hire rule applies only when work is done "at the instance and expense of
employer"; it was not work for hire where plaintiff conceived of Superman cartoon and later
revised and expanded it at direction of publisher.).
112 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw §§ 14.51(2), 14.53, 14.57(3) (McKinney 1984).
An earlier draft immunized only restoration measures, defined as acts "to return, or cause to
be returned, a deteriorated or damaged work of fine art as nearly as feasible to its original
state." A. 5052, 206th Sess. § 228-m(5) (N.Y. 1983). The major New York museums were
concerned by the passive role permitted. Fearing interference with the development of new
conservation techniques, they sharply criticized this draft. Telephone Interview with Wendy
E. Feuer, supra note 88. The revised Act, the product of close consultation with many conser-
vators, id, reflects this concern.
113 Letter from Carolyn Clark, Counsel to Whitney Museum of American Art, to Ben
Wiles, Assistant Counsel to New York Governor Cuomo (July 14, 1983) (on file at Cornell Law
Review).
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conservation would have the burden of proving that the museum per-
formed the work negligently. Artists may also sue when gross negligence
in maintaining the work results in its alteration.'
14
4. Damage to Reputation
Reputation is "[t]hat by which we are known and is the total sum
of how we are seen by others." 115 Under the New York Act, actions
based on alteration or defacement of artwork1 16 and actions to disclaim
authorship' 17 must include a showing of potential damage to the artist's
reputation. Although the California Act1 18 and the Berne Conven-
tion1 19 contain similar references to reputation, the French law does
not.120 Because even fledgling and unpopular artists have reputations,
this language in the New York Act should not limit a cause of action to
artists of renown. 121 It could, however, impose stringent limitations on
actions depending upon the quantum of proof the courts require to
demonstrate potential damage to reputation.
Under the New York Act, it is unclear whether the artist must
prove actual damages. In defamation cases, a slanderous remark affect-
ing the plaintiff in his business, trade, or calling is actionable without
114 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.57(1) (McKinney 1984).
115 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1171-72 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
116 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.53; set supra text accompanying notes 89-90
(discussing right of integrity under New York Act).
117 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.55; see supra text accompanying notes 86-88
(discussing right of paternity under New York Act).
118 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1984) (legislative finding that "physical altera-
tion and destruction" of art is "detrimental to artist's reputation").
119 Berne Convention art. 6bir, quoted supra note 3, gives an author the right to object to
changes that would be prejudicial to "honor or reputation," honor being more personal than
reputation, which connotes renown, fame and status in the art market.
120 Two recent cases make this explicit. In Guille c. Colmant, Judgment of Nov. 15,
1966, 1967, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1967 D.S. Jur. 284, discussed supra text accompanying notes
53-54, the Court annulled a contract clause obigating an artist to transfer his work without
signing it, deeming such terms injurious to the artist's name and reputation. The French
legal scholar, Raymond Sarraute, in an article commenting on the case, vigorously rebutted
the theoretical underpinning of the decision. He argued that Articles 1 & 2 of the French
Law of Mar. 11, 1957, supra note 1, were granted solely for the performance of the creative
act, regardless of the merit of the work produced. He concluded: "Les divers 6lments tradi-
tionnels du droit moral:. . . le droit de paternit6. . . sont absolument 6trangers aux notions
de notori6t de l'artiste et de valeur p~cunaire des ses oeuvres." Sarraute, Note [1967] Gaz.
Pal I. 18,19. ("The traditional elements of droit moral [including] the right of paternity...
are absolutely unrelated to the artist's reputation and the monetary value of his work.")
(translation by author of this Note).
In another case, one year later, the Cour de Cassation, the highest French court of ordi-
nary jurisdiction, settled the point by declaring that "la notori&t6 et la reputation d'un auteur
ne sont pas l'un des attributs de son droit moral." Judgment of Dec. 3, 1968, Cass. 1969 D.
73, 76 ("An artist's fame and reputation are not aspects of his moral rights.") (translation by
author of this Note).
121 Contra Note, Artworks, supra note 30, at 1209 & n.42.
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proof of actual damages; rather, damage is assumed to follow. 1 22 If the
remark does not affect his calling directly, courts demand proof of actual
pecuniary loss. 1 2 3 This proof may be elusive, often leaving plaintiffs in
defamation cases injured but without redress. Because anything affect-
ing the work of an artist necessarily affects the artist in her calling, the
courts should not require proof of actual damage. Such a requirement
would cripple the effectiveness of the Act.124
For example, David Smith's unadorned metal sculptures are more
critically acclaimed than his painted works. Consequently, by removing
the paint, the owners may not have harmed Smith's reputation or ca-
reer. 1 25 They did infringe on the artist's and society's interest in main-
taining the integrity of the work, however, and the Act should redress
such unauthorized alterations.
D. Enforcement
An action under the New York Act accrues to any aggrieved artist
whose work is displayed in an altered form within New York State.126
Rights granted under the Act are strictly personal and terminate upon
the death of the artist. The statute does not vest enforcement in the
artist's representatives, heirs, legatees, or executors. This limited dura-
tion of protection contrasts with the French Law of March 11, 1957,
which grants the droil moral in perpetuity, 127 and with other droit moral
statutes which recognize the right at least until the economic rights in
the work expire. 128
If the sole justification of the New York Act were to safeguard the
career and personal interests of artists, the current enforcement provi-
sions would fulfill the purpose. Society's interest in preserving the integ-
rity of artworks, however, survives the artist's death and warrants more
durable protection.129
E. Remedies
The New York Act provides for "legal and injunctive relief' for any
122 W. PROSSER, supra note 37, § 112, at 790-92.
123 Id
124 Unlike the tort of defamation, which "is not concerned with the plaintiff's own humil-
iation, wrath or sorrow," id. at 737, droit moral does protect the purely personal interests of an
artist. But see Letter from Matthew J. Murphy, supra note 75 ("[T]he artist must prove that
such a showing could damage his or her reputation."). Murphy does not suggest what type of
proof would be sufficient.
125 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
126 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAw §§ 14.57(5), 14.59() (McKinney 1984).
127 French Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 1, art. 6.
128 See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 7 (term of protection is life of author and
50 years after his or her death); German Law of Sept. 13, 1965, .mpra note 1, art. 64(1) (copy-
right expires 70 years after author's death).
129 See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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violation of the Act. 130 Injunctive relief might include a court order to
associate the artist's name with a work, 131 to prevent such association, 132
or to prevent the public display of an altered work if it is represented as
the work of the artist or would reasonably be regarded as such. 33
The nature and extent of legal relief under the Act is less clear. An
earlier draft of the Act provided for "damages, exemplary damages
where appropriate, equitable relief and reasonable attorney's and expert
witness's fees."' 134 By eliminating this language and substituting a provi-
sion for "legal and injunctive relief," the drafters intended to preclude
large punitive damages that might encourage frivolous claims. 135
Confronted with the same dilemma, but cognizant of the positive
deterrent effect of punitive damages, the California legislature devised
an alternative solution. Under the California law, punitive damages ac-
crue not to the artist, but to a court-selected charitable or educational
organization involved in the fine arts. 136 A similar approach would
strengthen the deterrent effect of the New York Act.
F. Summary
The foregoing analysis highlights the key provisions of the New
York legislature's efforts to enhance the rights of visual artists working
within the state. The New York Act is an eclectic and creative piece of
legislation, tailoring the tenets of moral rights to comport with the legal,
philosophical, and social concepts underlying New York law. The Act
offers artists a direct remedy to redress certain grievances. Had the stat-
ute been in effect in the spring of 1982, for example, when Frank Stella
130 N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.59 (McKinney 1984).
131 Id. § 14.55(1).
132 Id.
133 Id § 14.53.
134 A. 5052, 206th Sess. § 228-p (N.Y. 1983).
135 See Letter from Matthew J. Murphy, supra note 75 ("The bill only allows for injunc-
tive relief and legal fees, forcing an artist to think seriously before bringing an action against
an owner.") (emphasis added). This fear on the part of the sponsors may have been exagger-
ated; to date no case has been brought under the California statute. For dicta suggesting that
the courts would be receptive to proper claims under the Act, see Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks
Realtors, Inc., No. B003486, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1984) (available on LEXIS).
Only one suit has been filed to date in New York, Newmann v. Delmar Realty Co., No.
2955-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 1984) (on file at Comell Law Review). The case involves the
right of artist Robert Newmann to complete a mural on an exterior wall of the Palladium
Theater in Manhattan. In April, Judge Wilk granted Newmann's motion for an injunction
barring the defendants from altering the wall in the course of renovating the building. The
court based its decision on the fact that Newmann had an easement in gross, and that defend-
ants had constructive knowledge of the plaintiff's interest in property when they leased the
theater. Supplementing these reasons was the court's ruling that defendants' actions were "a
violation of the spirit and letter of the Artists' Authorship Rights Act." Id. at 9.
A second hearing in the matter was pending when this Note went to press.
136 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(3) (West 1982).
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discovered the two damaged paintings for sale as his original works, 137
he could have disclaimed authorship and prevented their public display
without employing the indirect method of a property action. 138
III
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
A. Right to Claim or Disclaim Authorship of Reproductions
Under the New York Act, the right to claim or disclaim authorship
does not explicitly extend to reproductions. 139 An understanding of the
goals of the Act-protection of artists' personality rights and the integ-
rity of original artworks- and a review of other provisions of the Act
suggest that this omission was inadvertent. Section 14.53, prohibiting
certain displays of defaced or modified works, 140 extends to "a work of
fine art . . .or a reproduction thereof."' 14 1 Section 14.57(2), limiting
claims arising from reproduction, refers both to violations of section
14.53 and to the right to disclaim authorship under section 14.55.142 In-
deed, if an artist could disclaim authorship of an altered reproduction,
there would be less need to object to its publication or display. 143 A
reproduction is not a unique work of art, and if the artist's reputation is
not at risk, alterations harm neither the artist, the original artwork, nor
society's interest in preserving the artwork. 44 Therefore, an amend-
ment providing the right to claim or disclaim authorship of a reproduc-
tion would remedy an oversight in the statute.
B. Extension of Enforcement Period
Under the current New York Act, all rights and protection termi-
nate with the artist's death. Such short-lived authorship rights fail to
fully defend the needs of artists, the integrity of artworks, and the pub-
lic's interest in cultural preservation. The Berne Convention demands
that, at a minimum, the artist's interests in a work continue until the
137 See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
138 N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAWv §§ 14.53, .55 (McKinney 1984).
139 Id. § 14.55.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
141 N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AF'. LAW § 14.53.
142 Id. § 14.57(2) ("In the case of a reproduction, a change that is an ordinary result of
the medium of reproduction does not by itself create a violation of section 14.53 . . .or a
right to disclaim authorship under ... section 14.55 . . ").
143 For example, in Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1933) (discussed
supra note 38), Neyland had no right to object to or prevent the sale of the embroidered
cushion because it was not his original work. However, the improper association of his name
with the altered and inferior design could inflict a loss to him and his reputation. The New
York Act should protect this interest.
144 For example, the numerous altered reproductions of Grant Wood's American Gothic
have not diminished his reputation or the original work, and arguably may have enhanced
our appreciation of the painting.
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economic interests in it expire.145 A copyright is enforceable for at least
fifty years after the artist's death.1 4 6 Lengthening the enforcement pe-
riod provided in the New York Act would bolster the deterrent effect of
the Act and still remain consistent with the New York legislature's ap-
proach of harmonizing droit moral with private ownership.
Extending the duration of protection under the Act raises the issue
of who, after the artist's death, should be entitled to enforce these rights.
Whether the artist's executors or heirs are competent to do so is debata-
ble, as the actions of David Smith's executors demonstrate.1 4 7 The Cali-
fornia Act entrusts enforcement to a public agency or private not-for-
profit organization acting "in the public interest."1 48 Because the bal-
ance of interests among artist, owner and public may shift after the art-
ist's death in favor of society's interest in preserving the integrity of the
work, some form of public enforcement may be the optimum solution.
C. Notice Prior to Destruction of Works
The New York Act should be amended to provide the artist with
the right to object to the unauthorized destruction of a work of art with-
out prior notice.1 49 The purpose of the Act is to protect an artist's en-
during personality interest in a work of art, preserve the integrity of a
work, and safeguard society's artistic treasures without unconstitution-
ally or unreasonably encroaching on an owner's property rights. A no-
tice requirement would not unduly interfere with the prerogatives of
ownership and would provide the artist an opportunity to negotiate or
arrange for the preservation of the work. 150 If no notice is given and an
act of removal borders on vandalism, as in the Noguchi incident de-
scribed earlier,15 1 monetary damages may be appropriate. Injunctive
relief is clearly inadequate.
145 Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bi.
146 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982) (copyright expires 50 years after artist's death); see also Ger-
man Law of Sept. 13, 1965, supra note 1, art. 64 (copyright expires 70 years after artist's
death).
147 See supra note 32 (discussing acts by executors of David Smith's estate).
148 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 989(c) (West Supp. 1984).
149 Unlike the California Act, the New York Act contains no protection for an artist
whose work has been destroyed. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a), (c) (West Supp. 1984).
In its present form the New York Act would not have benefited Isamu Noguchi, whose
sculpture "Shinto" was cut up and removed from the Bank of Tokyo's Manhattan office. See
supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
Whether European droil moral statutes extend to acts of destruction is unclear. See Mer-
ryman, supra note 2, at 1038-39 (suggesting that they do). Contra Note, Artworks, supra note 30,
at 1218 n.94.
150 The removal of the gargoyles from the old Bonwit Teller building exemplifies the
importance of notifying the artist, a public agency, or a museum before a work is destroyed.
The incident is reported and discussed in Barbanel, Grillwork Missing at Bonwit Building, N.Y.
Times, June 7, 1980, at A23, col. 2; Note, Artworks, supra note 30, at 1224-26; Note, Americani-
zation of Droit Moral, supa note 30, at 931 & nn.133-34.
151 See supra notes 28-29, 149 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act is a creative and pro-
gressive response to a void in our legal system. Rather than a rote adop-
tion of the droit moral the law adapts principles of moral rights to New
York's existing laws. An exercise of state power in an area previously
the exclusive province of private property laws not unexpectedly pro-
vokes opposition from some quarters. 15 2 Yet, precedent has unequivo-
cally established that the exercise of this power is fully justified
whenever there is an overriding public interest at stake.153 There is sub-
stantial public interest in protecting the personality rights of artists, the
integrity of artworks, and the cultural heritage of the residents of New
York.
The amendments proposed in this Note extend the protection avail-
able under the new law, yet remain in harmony with the framework of
the Act and the intent of the drafters. The amendments do not signifi-
cantly alter the balance among the competing interests of artists, art
owners, and the public. Other states should enact similar legislation.
By increasing the protection and enhancing the status of visual artists,
widespread recognition of artists' moral rights will improve the general
welfare.
Sarah Ann Smith
152 Se, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text; Memorandum from the State Educa-
tion Department to Counsel to the Governor (July 15, 1983) (recommending disapproval of
the bill since it "is inconsistent with traditional legal concepts of the rights of owners of works
of art"); Maslow, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1984, at 2 (The state should not
impose modifications of traditional property concepts on art owners; such modifications con-
stitute takings of property without due process.). But cf. supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
153 The Supreme Court has referred to the police power as "one of the most essential
powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exer-
cise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily." Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410
(1915).
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